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Introduction: Sino-American Relations and the “Five C’s” 
The coming decade could provide the opportunity for the United States to consolidate stable Sino-American 
relations and expand U.S.-China cooperation on a wide range of global and regional issues. The U.S. and China face 
many common challenges in a period of rapid globalization and growing strategic interdependence. Successful 
cooperation on a wide range of specific bilateral and international issues of strategic importance to both sides such 
as counter terrorism and non-proliferation could serve to reduce lingering suspicions of each other’s strategic 
intentions and pave the way for development of “normal” relations between the two nations.  
This period could also lead in a different direction. China and the U.S. face many obstacles in the path of smooth 
development of bilateral relations and the expansion of strategic cooperation. They continue to have often-sharp 
differences over many bilateral issues, including trade and human rights. Cross-Strait relations especially remain a 
potential source of serious tension and even conflict between the U.S. and China. And deep suspicions of each 
other’s long-term strategic intentions remain on both sides, especially those resulting from China’s emergence as a 
great power and apparent U.S. determination to prevent the rise of a peer competitor. Some Americans are 
concerned that China might use its growing economic and political influence in East Asia to reduce U.S. regional 
influence in a zero-sum contest for strategic advantage. They also warn that China might use its growing military 
power for aggressive purposes against Taiwan or China’s neighbors. Some Chinese likewise suspect that the U.S. 
seeks to slow China’s economic growth, circumscribe its political influence and prevent the reunification of Taiwan 
with the Mainland. In short, differences over specific bilateral and international issues and mutual suspicions may 
limit improvement of relations or even lead to a protracted period of strategic competition and even military conflict. 
This analysis is cautiously optimistic that the first path-that toward building more robust Sino-American ties is 
possible and that appropriate U.S. and Chinese policies can encourage the development of a long-term, stable 
relationship as well as a U.S.-China strategic partnership on a broad range of issues of strategic importance to the 
United States. Such a relationship will not be conflict-free or without competitive aspects, especially in the political 
and economic realms. And a robust U.S. presence in East Asia, including strong alliance relationships with Japan 
and other traditional U.S. allies, will continue to be important to maintain regional stability, provide reassurance to 
regional states during this period of “China’s rise”, and to “hedge” against the possible emergence of a more 
conflictual relationship with China as well as possible conflict over Taiwan. But the United States is not likely to 
conclude that a strategy of containment toward China is either necessary or feasible. Similarly, China will likely 
continue to pursue a strategy of seeking close ties with the United States rather than adopt an anti-hegemonist 
coalition strategy to counter American power and influence.i At the same time, the Chinese will likely seek to 
develop closer ties and cooperation with the European Union and other powers to bolster China’s bargaining 
position vis—vis the United States and hedge against the possibility of a sharp deterioration in Sino-American 
relations. 
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A key factor underlying my optimism is the assessment, argued in this paper, that “globalization” is reshaping the 
global strategic environment. In this new strategic situation, the interests of the United States and China will limit 
strategic competition between them and compel closer cooperation to respond to shared strategic threats and 
challenges. Globalization has led to converging though by no means identical national interests in many critical 
areas and a common interest in maintaining the overall global system of regimes, treaties and organizations 
governing international economic, political and security relations to the benefit of both countries. This high-level 
common interest does not preclude sharp differences over specific issues, but it is likely to create pressure on the 
United States and China to cooperate in many areas to defend, maintain and strengthen the system and to restrain 
them from pursuing containment or confrontational strategies toward each other. 
Globalization has led to what could be called the “Five C’s”:  
˄1˅ Increasing constraints on U.S. and Chinese strategic options vis-a-vis each other created by growing strategic interdependence. 
˄2˅ Expanding common interests on an increasingly wide array of international and global issues.  
˄3˅ Increasing need for bilateral and multilateral strategic cooperation to meet the twin challenges presented by the globalizing and non-
globalized worlds and transnational threats. 
˄4˅ Inherent contradictions in globalization leading to conflicts over a myriad of issues that are often created by or exacerbated by 
globalization and the growing integration, interdependence and mutual vulnerability of globalizing states. 
˄5˅ On-going competition for political and economic advantage between nation-states in the global arena, although not zero-sum strategic 
competition for overall dominance.
1. Constraints on U.S. and Chinese Strategic Options 
Globalization has created a new “strategic interdependence” among globalizing states as these states’ economic 
power has become increasingly dependent on maintaining, deepening and broadening economic ties with other 
globalizing states and the international system of peace and stability in which those economic ties thrive. Jockeying 
among states for political influence and economic advantage will continue, but this is likely to occur almost 
exclusively within the parameters of the international system that the major powers, now including China, recognize 
must be respected and jointly defended to preserve their own national interests. Thus, although successfully 
globalizing states may be economic and political competitors in the future, they are not likely to be strategic 
competitors in a zero-sum contest in which gains for one power, including economic, are necessarily a loss for the 
other, and in which their long-term strategic goal is to weaken if not defeat the other power as was the case in the 
U.S.-Soviet strategic competition of the Cold War. Rather, these states will find the growth, prosperity and security 
of other powers essential to their own security and economic well-being. This view contradicts the views of 
prominent Realists, who see a clash between the established dominant power and a rising power, specifically China, 
as virtually inevitable, and call for efforts to slow and contain the growth of Chinese power.ii In my view, however, 
the use of force or threat of force to gain strategic advantage or to settle disputes among the globalizing states is 
likely to be viewed by leaders as potentially high cost/high risk without comparable, if any, benefits, and thus not 
likely to be pursued as deliberate policy-although miscalculation can never be ruled out entirely, and in the case of 
China and the United States, the Taiwan issue, which is left over from the pre-globalization era, holds the potential 
for direct military conflict between the two globalizing powers.  
The Bush Administration has expressed optimism about the prospects for the major powers avoiding conflict. 
President Bush, in his 2002 National Security Strategy report, declared that “today, the international community has 
the best chance since the rise of the nation-state in the seventeenth century to build a world where great powers 
compete in peace instead of continually prepare for war. Today, the world’s great powers find ourselves on the same 
side-united by common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos.”iii And Ambassador Richard Haass, as President 
Bush’s Director of Policy Planning in the State Department, said in 2002, “war between the great powers” is “almost 
unthinkable.”iv Even Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld noted in early June, 2004, that “future dangers will less 
likely be from battles between great powers, and more likely from enemies that work in small cells, that are fluid 
and strike without warning anywhere, anytime enemies that have access to increasingly formidable technology and 
weapons.”v
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Globalizing states are increasingly vulnerable to threats that emanate from weak and failing states that is, from 
the least globalized states and non-state actors who utilize those countries. These threats range from terrorist cells 
operating from territories outside of state control to transnational crime, regional conflict, religious extremism, 
massive refugee flows, environmental damage with global consequences, and the incubation and spread of 
infectious diseases-all of which threaten not only those states themselves but also the security of the globalizing 
world. Consequently, the globalizing states face a new strategic imperative to enhance their bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation to meet the near and long-term challenges posed by the least-globalized states and help bring those 
states into the globalizing world and become “succeeding” rather than failing nations.vi
The new strategic reality may be understood as another form of the bipolarity, albeit vastly different than the 
division of the world during the Cold War. The world is now divided not between two superpower-controlled blocs, 
but between the areas of relative stability, order, prosperity, interconnectedness and interdependence among the 
globalizing states-including Europe, North American, and much of Eurasia, Northeast and Southeast Asia, and Latin 
America-and the areas of relative instability, disorder, economic decline and little interconnectedness or 
interdependence, including some areas of Southeast, South and Central Asia (and North Korea in Northeast Asia) 
and much of the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa and parts of the Caribbean and Latin America.vii Evidence of the 
security implications of this new division of the world is demonstrated by U.S. use of force in the last fifteen years, 
which has been exclusively in and against weak, failing and “rogue” states. This new “bipolarity” is inherently fuzzy 
and unstable, however, since these divergent areas shift over time, are not clearly demarcated, may even be within 
states, and are not self-defined blocs like NATO and the Warsaw Pact as no country wants to be a “failing state.” 
Some strategists, foreign policy experts, and government officials will continue to be concerned primarily about a 
potential long-term threat posed by the rise of a “peer competitor” among the globalizing states, that is, China, rather 
than about the threats from the non-globalized world. Planning will continue in the Department of Defense for 
possible military conflict with Beijing over Taiwan.viii Nevertheless, for the foreseeable future, the strategic foci of 
U.S. national security policy will likely be on working with globalizing states to manage the challenges and threats 
emanating from non-globalized, failing states, including pursuit of the “global war on terror” (GWOT), the 
unfinished conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the struggle to democratize the Middle East. This new strategic 
reality was outlined in President Bush’s September 2002 National Security Strategy, which implied a new strategic 
map that is likely to define the challenges of the 21st Century for the United States, Europe, China and other 
globalizing states. 
Globalizing States Face Unrelenting Challenges 
Globalization also poses unrelenting challenges to managing the globalizing world. Globalization has had a 
transforming impact on the world in the last quarter century that has been accelerating with no respite in sight. In the 
words of an ancient Chinese poem, “the tree prefers calm but the wind will not subside.” The changes wrought by 
globalization are profound and affect almost all aspects of life from shifting the tectonic plates of geopolitics to 
vastly expanding international people-to-people communications via the internet. The National Intelligence Council 
report, Mapping The Global Future, notes that whereas in their previous report, Global Trends 2015, “we viewed 
globalization as among an array of key drives, we now view it more as a mega-trend’-a force so ubiquitous that it 
will substantially shape all of the other major trends in the world of 2020.”ix The process driving globalization 
forward, which is inherently disruptive and relentless,x played a major role in the demise of the Soviet empire and 
the opening up of China and India, thus bringing nearly 3 billion additional people into the globalizing world.  
Globalization is rapidly integrating the world economy-and increasing interdependence for economic growth and 
prosperity. Ghadar and Peterson, in Global Tectonics: What Every Business Needs to Know, note that corporations 
are conducting business across a much more highly integrated global economic system.xi They cite the example of 
the Airbus Consortium: “Britain exports the aircraft’s wings, while Germany supplies the fuselage and the tail. 
Spain manufactures the doors, and France oversees cockpit production and final assembly. More than 800 American 
companies supply in excess of 35% of the Consortium’s aircraft components, with 1,500 other providers located in 
approximately 30 additional counties. Airbus employs some 48,000 people, representing more than 50 nationalities, 
and is now one of the many corporations that contract foreign companies to manufacture products that are then sold 
around the world.”xii This global integration also creates critical business vulnerabilities to disruptions from both 
suppliers of components and purchasers of finished products.  
2. Common Interests increasing in the Globalization Era 
Failing States and Transnational Threats Challenge Globalizing Nations 
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economy in the future as trade, financial, investment and manufacturing platform links among globalized states 
growing wider and deeper, thus leaving these countries even more mutually vulnerable. In addition, globalization is 
likely to continue to widen discrepancies in wealth within and between nations with potentially volatile 
implications.xiii  Moreover, demographic trends are also likely to dramatically alter geopolitical equations with youth 
population bulges, rapid urbanization, and creation of megacities in the developing world on the one hand, and 
increasing numbers of retired workers and shrinking populations in most of the developed countries on the other.xiv
The world is also facing unprecedented and converging environmental problems that have been exacerbated by 
globalization and which increasingly pose international and even global threats requiring coordinated international 
responses. Jared Diamond, in Collapse: How States Choose to Fail or Succeed, outlines twelve environmental 
problems facing modern societies and concludes not only that each is a serious threat but that many are interlinked 
and mutually reinforcing.xv  Diamond maintains that “our world is presently on a non-sustainable course, and any of 
our twelve problems of non-sustainability would suffice to limit our lifestyle within the next several decades. They 
are like time bombs with fuses of less than 50 years.” Diamond concludes that “because we are rapidly advancing 
along this non-sustainable course, the world’s environmental problems will get resolved, in one way or another, 
within the lifetimes of the children and young adults alive today. The only question is whether they will become 
resolved in pleasant ways of our own choice, or in unpleasant ways not of our choice, such as warfare, genocide, 
starvation, disease epidemics, and collapses of societies.”xvi  Diamond may be overly pessimistic,xvii but there is little 
doubt environmental problems are worsening, broadening in scope and impact, mutually reinforcing, and 
increasingly global. These dangers, which could become major threats to economic prosperity and even national 
security, are likely to require international responses, and thus compel nations to cooperate. 
Globalization has also made possible terrorism like that pursued by Al Qaeda: the reach of terrorists can be 
global; the means at their disposal may include weapons of mass destruction that have been produced and 
disseminated in the globalization process; their method of organization and communication may rely heavily on the 
internet, computers and other high-technology that provides part of the backbone of globalization itself; the target of 
their attack may be globalization itself; and terrorist attacks may have a global impact. The 9.11 attack was, of 
course, the signature event for this connection of globalization and terrorism. Although the terrorists did not use 
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons to carry out their assault on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, the 
attack was planned in one of the world’s least globalized states on the other side of the planet using modern means 
of transportation and information technology. In Iraq, international terrorist organizations are, in effect, using 
advanced “supply chain” methods of the global economy to maintain a continuous flow of suicide bombers.xviii In 
addition, the attack represented a backlash to globalization. The aim of the attack was not a specific political 
objective but to radically affect the world situation by inflicting grievous harm on the United States and the world 
economy. The connection between globalization and the new international terrorism is not just a coincidence but 
rather globalization has contributed to motivating such terrorism and to making it feasible. That is, the roots of 
global-reach terrorism are, paradoxically, in both the impact of globalization and the failure of states to be 
globalized, especially to modernize their societies and economies. 
The Challenges Posed by “Rising China” 
“Rising China” which has been the result of and contributed to globalization-has become perhaps the single most 
important factor shaping the rapidly-changing geopolitical landscape of the 21st Century.xix China has become the 
largest “delta” or change factor in the world economy. Higher world energy and commodity prices are attributed 
largely to China’s rapidly increasing demand, spurred in turn by China’s seemingly perpetual economic growth of 
around 8-9% per year. China’s emergence as the world’s manufacturing platform is compelling a restructuring of 
global manufacturing networks and even national economies. China is now a magnet for low-skill jobs “outsourced” 
by the U.S. and other advanced countries; it is also increasingly “moving up the food chain,” producing highly-
educated workers to entice multinational companies to set up research and development centers in China, thus 
raising a new round of fears about outsourcing innovation and high-paying jobs from the United States. China is 
also the largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the world, with more than $60 billion received in 
2004 and nearly $570 billion received since 1982. China has become the world’s third largest trading country behind 
the U.S. and Germany and ahead of Japan, with $1.15 trillion in trade in 2004 (nearly balanced between exports and 
imports with a net surplus of only $32 billion). Inexpensive goods from China have maintained downward pressure 
Thus, globalization, while creating such increasingly integrated global economy and promising greater prosperity 
and ever-advancing technology for many people on the planet, may also be creating an even more volatile world 
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China’s low-cost goods. Critically, China holds $200 billion in U.S. treasury bonds and over $600 billion in foreign 
exchange, helping to finance the U.S. trade and budget deficits as well as U.S. imports of Chinese goods. In short, 
China has a huge impact on the world economy, on the U.S. economy, and on U.S. global, regional and bilateral 
economic interests. 
China has paid the price for its stunning economic growth of becoming increasingly interdependent with the U.S. 
and the world economy.xx Nearly forty percent of China’s gross domestic product (GDP) is based on exports and 
more than 50% of those exports are generated by foreign companies operating in China. A loss of markets for 
exports or termination of foreign enterprise operations in China would be devastating for the Chinese economy and 
likely lead to social unrest and political instability in China. And this combination of economic decline and internal 
instability would likely result in a sharp reduction in China’s absolute and relative comprehensive national power. 
China’s political system, in contrast to the rapid advancement of the economy, struggles to keep pace with the 
demands of participation in the global economy and the social and economic dislocation-as well as demands for 
political accountability-that globalization engenders. China’s rigid authoritarian system is viewed by many as the 
source of structural impediments to economic reform (as well as continuing violations of human rights) and the 
potential source of severe economic crisis and social instability. China’s leaders are acutely aware of the social and 
political tensions created by the widening income gap between the rich and poor as well as between the coastal and 
inland areas, and they have placed a high priority on addressing these issues. China experiences thousands of local 
protests every year by disgruntled workers and peasants, angered by corruption, environmental damage, layoffs and 
other grievances. The leadership has been willing to experiment with democratic elections at the village level, 
apparently in a bid to hold local officials more accountable, limit corruption and let off some steam. But Chinese 
leaders, apparently fearing the spread of demonstrations and political unrest and apparently worried that greater 
democracy could lead to greater instability and threaten Communist Party rule, have responded by taking steps to 
strengthen one-party rule rather than to further democratize the political system. 
While China’s domestic problems are far from American shores, severe political, social and economic distress in 
China-home to one-fifth of the world’s population-would dramatically affect the interests of U.S. businesses, U.S 
consumers, and the entire world economy-an example of the mutual vulnerability that is exacerbated by 
globalization and strategic interdependence. Thus, the U.S. has a growing stake in China’s economic viability if not 
success at the same time that Americans hope for a political transformation of China toward greater democracy, 
accountability and respect for human rights. 
Managing the additional adverse impact on the environment of the emergence of China as well as India and other 
rising powers will be another major strategic concern of the 21st Century. China especially represents an 
environmental challenge as both a consumer of natural resources, including oil, and a despoiler of the environment, 
from production of greenhouse gases and acid rain to deforestation, pollution and exhaustion of the water supply.xxi
One extreme calculation by Lester Brown of the Earth Policy Institute illustrates the potential impact of China: “if 
the Chinese use oil at the same rate as Americans now do,” according to Brown, “by 2031 China would need 99 
million barrels of oil per day. The world currently produces 79 million barrels per day and may never produce much 
more than that.”xxii Moreover, global warming and other environmental affects of such an increase in global energy 
consumption could be massive and unsustainable. In short, the world will have to find alternatives to maintaining 
the current course in resource consumption and environmental damage by China, India and other rising economies-
as well as by the United States and other developed nations. It is unlikely that these countries can duplicate the U.S. 
model in per capita consumption of resources even if they manage to catch up with the current level of U.S. per 
capita income. This is one of many high-priority international challenges requiring global strategic cooperation that 
China’s rise is exacerbating. 
China’s international diplomacy also has a growing impact on U.S. regional and global interests. The Chinese 
have played a positive role in addressing many strategic concerns of the United States, including the war on 
terrorism and efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). China’s decision to 
organize and host the Six-Party Talks aimed at eliminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons program was 
unprecedented and welcomed by the United States. China has taken other steps to increase its positive international 
engagement, including joining a wide range of international organizations and regimes established under the 
leadership of the United States over the last 60 years. In addition, the Chinese have committed military and police 
iii
on prices of manufactured consumer goods in the United States and throughout the world, helping stave off inflation 
and benefiting consumers but also extracting a “China price” for other manufacturers globally to compete with 
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in its intentions. China took the lead in establishing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to work with Russia and 
Central Asian states to address common security threats, especially terrorism, and to eventually develop a political 
and economic community. In Southeast Asia, China has eased concerns about its territorial claims in the South 
China Sea, has established the ASEAN plus One mechanism for dialogue with regional states, and agreed to the 
creation of a Free Trade Agreement with ASEAN. 
Coping with China’s rise, which has been spurred by globalization, has become a primary focus of geopolitics in 
East Asia and of U.S policy in the region. Although the Chinese economic juggernaut has played a key role in 
Japan’s economic recovery and in the rising prosperity of East Asia as a whole, Sino-Japanese political relations 
deteriorated sharply in early 2005 with deepening mutual suspicions, aggravated on the Japanese side by growing 
unease at China’s growing economic, political and military power. China’s political-economic strategy toward 
Southeast Asia effectively diffused previous tensions over the disputed South China Sea and eased (but not 
eliminated) concerns about China as an economic competitor as well as a potential military threat while opening 
new investment and trade opportunities in Sino-ASEAN relations. Yet China’s “success” in Southeast Asia has 
created disquiet throughout the region and sown fears in the United States that China’s rise will be at U.S. 
expense.xxiv And while China has played a constructive role in establishing and bringing North Korea into the Six-
Party talks, the North Korea nuclear weapons issue remains unresolved, and many people in the United States and 
the region maintain that China is not putting sufficient pressure on North Korea to resolve the issue. China’s March 
2005 Anti-Secession Law also raised concerns that Beijing was stepping up pressure on Taiwan and increasing the 
risks of military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Beyond Asia, China’s apparent willingness to place its energy 
interests above international humanitarian and non-proliferation concerns in its relations with Iran and Sudan has 
provoked concern that China is prepared to go its own way at the expense of U.S. interests and international norms, 
although not necessarily international law. 
Concerns about China’s growing economic power and diplomatic influence have been fueled by the 
modernization of the Chinese military. Although China’s military modernization appears focused primarily on 
Taiwan contingencies, including preparing for possible military conflict with the United States, the improvements in 
Chinese military capabilities have raised doubts in the United States about China’s intentions beyond the Taiwan 
Strait. China’s increasing naval activities in areas surrounding Japan have heightened Japanese suspicions of China, 
further aggravating the already cool political relationship between Beijing and Tokyo despite burgeoning Sino-
Japanese economic ties. 
Not surprisingly, business leaders, politicians, policymakers, analysts and the general public in the United States 
and elsewhere in the world have viewed China’s rise as either creating new opportunities or posing new dangers-or 
both. Much of the U.S. and global business community has seen a “must be there” opportunity to sell in the Chinese 
market as well as to exploit China’s export manufacturing platform for a global supply chain built on China’s 
seemingly endless supply of low-paid workers and potential consumers. At the same time, U.S. political and 
business leaders also see a wide range of increasing threats from China’s extraordinary growth, outsourcing, surging 
energy and commodity prices, to the emergence of credible competitors in higher value markets, such as the 
December 2004 purchase of the iconic IBM PC business by the Chinese computer maker Lenovo. U.S. political 
leaders have welcomed China’s cooperation on terrorism and non-proliferation efforts, including the Six Party 
Talks, but view with concern China’s growing activism and influence in Asia, its posture toward Taiwan and its 
military modernization program.  
China’s New Perspective on its National Interests 
The new strategic environment of globalization has led to a profound shift in China’s view of the world and 
Chinese interests. China’s extraordinary economic growth has transformed China from a virtual non-player 25 years 
ago into a key factor in today’s world economy with a greatly increased international presence and influence-and a 
commensurate national security interest in maintaining a peaceful strategic environment and a healthy global and 
regional economy. Chinese leaders are aware that China has benefited as much from globalization as any other 
country in the last three decades-and that this benefit has been obtained at the “cost” of concomitant strategic 
interdependence. This cost is not only seen in mutual and shared vulnerabilities with other major states, especially 
the United States, but also in the limitations on Chinese sovereignty of integration into the globalizing world as 
symbolized by China’s agreement to change its domestic laws and institutions as the price of entrance into the WTO 
personnel to more than a dozen UN peace-keeping operations over the past decade.xxiii China has also employed 
considerable diplomatic and economic means to improve relations with neighboring countries and build confidence 
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jeopardize China’s economic development and political and social stability if they had succeeded in crippling the 
American economy. 
Bordered by a number of countries that have provided safe haven to terrorists, including Afghanistan, Pakistan 
and some Central Asian states, China also has began to recognize the urgency of responding to the threats emanating 
from weak and failing states, including not only global terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to 
unstable or hostile regimes and non-state actors, but also piracy, international crime and smuggling networks, 
incubation and spread of deadly diseases, and regional conflicts and humanitarian crises. This recognition has lead 
China closer to U.S. perspectives on the dangers emanating from failing states and to accepting rationales for 
international intervention in the internal affairs of other countries.xxv The shift in Chinese perspectives on terrorism 
has been accompanied by signs of significant changes in Chinese strategic thinking and foreign policy more 
generally.xxvi
China’s growing strategic interdependence and its increasing stake in the international system have created a new 
imperative for China to cooperate with the United States-and other major powers-to manage the global and regional 
economy and to maintain international peace and security. This new strategic paradigm also stimulated a re-thinking 
of China’s economic diplomacy and foreign policyxxvii and its perspective on the role and policy of the United 
States.xxviii President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao have encouraged a trend toward a more nuanced view of the 
United States role in the world, including tacit acceptance of U.S. “leadership.” In the past, the Chinese viewed U.S. 
“hegemony” as inherently illegitimate and threatening to China. The emerging-and still controversial-view in China 
accepts the value-even the need-for a benign U.S. hegemony or leadership in the world as long as the United States 
does not engage in hegemonic behavior toward China itself, especially over Taiwan.xxix
Hu and Wen also adopted a more open and proactive foreign policy. This new activism has been especially 
apparent in establishing the Six-Party Talks and in China’s burgeoning political and economic cooperation with 
Southeast Asian nations. If sustained, such actions would signal the embrace of a new international role for China, 
aimed at taking and demonstrating a greater responsibility for maintaining a peaceful and stable international 
environment. They would also help reassure the world that the rise of China will be peaceful and supportive of the 
international system rather than aggressive, disruptive and ultimately catastrophic like the rise of Germany and 
Japan in the 20th Century. The Chinese leadership has concluded, according Chinese officials and policy advisers, 
that the only way China, as a rising power, can avoid conflict with the dominant power, the United States, is not 
only to eschew challenging the current hegemon but also to forge a close partnership with it. Although Chinese 
leaders are not likely to articulate this strategic view so explicitly, they have reassured U.S. officials that China does 
not seek to reduce or eliminate U.S. presence, including military presence, in the Asia Pacific region and that China 
wants to cooperate with the United States on a wide range of issues of strategic importance to both countries. The 
Chinese are critical of many aspects of Bush Administration foreign policy, especially U.S. “unilateralism” and the 
doctrine of preventive war. But most Chinese critiques of U.S. foreign policy parallel those of U.S. allies in Europe 
and many American critiques as well rather than based on “anti-imperialist” and “anti-hegemonist” principles that 
animated Chinese foreign policy in the past.  
Regional Issues Transformed by Globalization 
Globalization has had a broadly transformative effect on East Asia’s key regional conflicts, especially the 
unresolved Taiwan issue, the North Korean nuclear weapons dispute and broader questions regarding the future of 
the Korean Peninsula. Only a generation ago, industrial North Korea, backed by the Soviet Union and China, 
seemed to be the economically and militarily stronger power. Today, North Korea is in many ways a failing state 
which has been left in the dust by a prosperous South Korea. The South is an economic powerhouse and, in some 
areas, a global technology leader. South Korea has “capitalized” on its interconnectedness with globalization while 
the North has economically declined due in large part to its self-imposed economic and political isolation as well as 
to the end of subsidies from Russia and the continuation of only “life support” aid from an alienated China. 
Moreover, North Korea’s drive to acquire nuclear weapons also may have been a response to the shifting balance of 
comprehensive national power under globalization as Pyongyang sought a “cheap equalizer” in nuclear weapons to 
compensate for a declining economy and defense industrial base that could not compete with the South in 
conventional weaponry. As North Korea has become more disconnected from the globalization process that is 
enveloping the rest of East Asia and apparently willing to engage in high-risk, aggressive behavior, its chief patron, 
and attracting huge amounts of FDI. In addition, as noted above, the 9.11 attack on the United States highlighted 
China’s new vulnerability to the fate of its international partners since the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks could also have 
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Regarding the Taiwan issue, China’s deep enmeshment in globalization, while leading to its extraordinary 
prosperity, has also resulted in China becoming strategically interdependent with the United States, Japan and other 
major economic powers, dramatically raising the economic as well as political cost to Beijing of using military force 
to resolve the Taiwan issue. A loss of markets for exports or termination of foreign enterprise operations in China, 
including nearly 60,000 Taiwan businesses operating on the Mainland, would be devastating for the Chinese 
economy, likely leading to social unrest and political instability and thus to a sharp decline in Chinese national 
power. This does not eliminate the possibility that China will use military force to deter Taiwan independence or 
even to “resolve” the Taiwan issue and rising nationalism coupled with generations of propaganda about the unity of 
China could compel Chinese leaders to take actions contrary to China’s larger strategic interests. But it does suggest 
that China’s rapidly growing economic and political power, while providing the resources for shifting the bilateral 
military balance across the Strait, have not lowered the political, economic and strategic costs to Beijing of military 
conflict with Taiwan and the United States. 
The nature of the Taiwan issue also has been transformed as Taiwan has evolved into a democracy in part 
resulting from Taiwan’s extraordinary economic growth and technological development over the last quarter century 
under globalization. The economic convergence between Taiwan and the Mainland and their increasing economic 
integration spurred by globalization has not, however, led to political convergence. Taiwan’s democratization has 
led to a greater assertion of “Taiwan identity” and even support for Taiwan independence or permanent separation 
from the Mainland. As long as the Mainland and Taiwan fail to find common ground for a permanent settlement or 
at least a long-term “peace and stability framework,” cross-Strait relations will be a potential flashpoint for war, 
including military conflict between the U.S. and China. Even short of war, the on-going build up of Chinese and 
U.S. forces preparing for such a confrontation is likely to continue to contribute to mutual suspicions about each 
other’s strategic intentions. 
 3. Cooperation: A Strategic Necessity 
The U.S., China and other globalizing states have a growing shared interest in the health and integrity over the 
overall international system. In addition, they increasingly face common threats to their national interests and 
security. These threats cumulatively pose a strategic threat, in some ways as demanding as that posed to the United 
States and its allies and friends by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. Moreover, like the 
Cold War, most of the challenges, dangers and threats faced by the globalizing states, including the United States 
and China, cannot be managed solely or even primarily through unilateral measures. Thus, the globalizing states 
face a compelling strategic imperative to cooperate in managing the globalizing and non-globalized worlds as the 
interconnectedness and interdependence among globalizing countries broadens and deepens. These new threats are 
more diverse, diffuse, and often do not originate with the actions of a state and thus they are more difficult to 
recognize as a strategic set of problems. 
The United States, China and other major powers are likely to find that they increasingly face common strategic 
threats and share strategic interests that compel them to find new ways to enhance cooperation as well as to avoid 
conflict. The new strategic environment of the globalization era calls for placing more emphasis on cooperative or 
parallel responses among the major powers to address common strategic threats and dangers and less emphasis on 
counter-balancing strategies to respond to perceived potential strategic threats posed by each other and the shifting 
balance of power. Most of the security challenges facing these powers, including from transnational threats, emanate 
from or are exacerbated by weak and failing states. The Bush Administration has expressed optimism about the 
prospects of the great powers working together to meet common threats and challenges rather than engaging in a 
protracted balance-of-power struggle for dominance despite continued concern within the Administration that 
China’s rise could eventually pose a strategic challenge to the United States. Richard Haass, as Director of the Bush 
Administration Policy Planning Staff in the State Department said in April 2002 that “we can turn our efforts from 
containment and deterrence to consultation and cooperation. We can move from a balance of power to a pooling of 
power.”xxx As a result of this new strategic reality, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld also called for the United States 
to: strengthen its partnerships with existing allies and friends and work with new ones; develop greater flexibility to 
deal with the unexpected; focus on more rapidly deployable capabilities and power rather than simply static 
presence and mass; and break down artificial barriers between regions in planning.xxxi
China, has become more enmeshed in globalization, more dependent on regional stability, and less willing to 
tolerate the provocative and dangerous behavior of its erstwhile ally. 
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failing and rogue states and transnational threats, on the one hand, and the challenges of managing relations and 
conflicts among globalizing states on the other. The need for such cooperation is readily apparent in many areas 
from the fight against Al Qaeda, which reportedly has terrorist cells in some sixty countries, to stopping the spread 
of infectious disease like the 2003 outbreak of SARS. 
Bilateral and multilateral cooperation, while necessary to respond to the most serious security threats facing the 
globalizing states, also could serve to build “habits of cooperation” and strengthen strategic trust among the 
globalizing states, including China and the United States. This would contribute to developing both the bilateral and 
multilateral institutional infrastructure and the mutual confidence to maximize the prospects for successful 
management of the new world of strategic interdependence. 
4. Contradictions Foster Conflicts among Globalizing States 
Although globalization has created a wide range of shared interests among globalizing states, comprehensive 
international cooperation on these sets of strategic problems will be difficult to achieve and sustain since globalizing 
states are increasingly mutually vulnerable to the political, social and economic instability and conflicts within and 
among other globalizing states as well as to the volatilities of the international economy. The many contradictions 
that are inherent in or spawned by globalization often seem to preoccupy nations and inhibit or prevent their ability 
to place higher priority on common concerns and threats. Some of the contradictions of globalization that inhibit 
international cooperation, including between the United States and China, include: 
·  Globalization is inherently disruptive as societies open to outside influences, which include “creative destruction” and economic dislocation as 
national economies become increasingly integrated with each other and thus increasingly vulnerable to the vagaries, advances, and “leveling” of the world 
economy, including global labor arbitrage.xxxii
· Globalization’s disruptive impact can threaten traditional cultures, religions, ways of life, elites’ prerogatives, the economic well-being of subnational 
groups as well as entire nations, and ultimately lead to social and political instability. The “no” votes on the European Constitution by France and the 
Netherlands in May and June of 2005 were apparently motivated in large part by concerns about globalization threatening the standard of living in these 
countries. 
· The interconnectedness of globalization, especially via increasingly widely available and nearly-instantaneous media, leads to greater awareness of 
differences between people in one country or subnational groups and those in other nations and groups. Global awareness seems more often to enhances 
the sense of “otherness” and even threat posed by other states as well as different cultures and religions rather than to heighten individual’s, groups’ and 
nation’s sense of common humanity and shared interests. 
· Globalization can thus lead to greater resentment of other nations and groups as the perceived cause of painful economic disruptions, as Americans, 
for example, point to “outsourcing” of jobs to India and China as the cause of unemployment in the United States. 
· Globalization’s contradictions can fuel nationalism and nationalist pressures on leaders to take positions on trade, politics and security issues that are 
detrimental to or a diversion from broader strategic interests international cooperation. Globalization’s information flows, for example, can lead to greater 
awareness of foreign “insults,” such as the Japanese government’s approval of history textbooks that gloss over Japan’s World War II atrocities, 
exacerbating pressures on Chinese and South Korean politicians to “stand up” against the foreign threat or humiliation. 
· Globalization’s pressures can exacerbate religion’s tendency to reinforce narrow tribalism-“us versus them” -views of other subnational groups, other 
countries or religions, complicating efforts at international cooperation on a wide range of issues. Moreover, religious “Truth” can often be invoked to 
insist that no compromises can be made on vital issues such as responses to sexually transmitted diseases and demographic pressures. 
· Despite unprecedented prosperity and growth on a global scale, globalization has coincided with or contributed to a growing income gap between rich 
and poor within countries like China and between countries and regions. xxxiiiThis wealth gap coincides with increasing awareness of the riches of the rich 
by the poor and disenfranchised, potentially fueling social and political conflict and instability. Moreover, while “all ships may rise” among the globalizing 
states, some will benefit more-and rise faster-than others, possibly exacerbating uncertainties, competition and conflicts. 
There is often only a small political constituency in most countries for basing national policy on long-term 
strategic considerations and the need for international cooperation rather than on the exigencies of the moment, 
domestic political considerations, and narrow definitions of national interest. There may be an evolution of human 
society toward increasing complexity and the need for cooperationxxxiv-which is shown in everyday transactions on a 
global scale-but public consciousness has not kept pace with this growing interdependence. 
Besides greater bilateral cooperation among the globalizing states, enhanced international cooperation and 
perhaps new multilateral mechanisms will be necessary to meet the dangers and challenges emanating from weak, 
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The new strategic environment does not eliminate political and economic competition between globalizing states, 
competition which may intensify in response to the rise of China and India. But that competition is likely to remain 
within a framework of strategic interdependence and thus a mutual interest in preserving the larger framework of 
competition, that is, the institutions and the rules of the game. Such a pattern exists between the U.S. and its 
traditional allies in Europe and Japan, in which disputes ranging from the war in Iraq to genetically-modified foods 
can lead to bitter, nasty and protracted political conflict do not put the entire relationship in jeopardy much less raise 
the prospect of military confrontation. Evolution of such a “normal” relationship between the U.S. and China may 
be possible in the coming decade, although the Taiwan issue is an “abnormal” element in Sino-American relations 
which has the potential for military confrontation and which in peacetime requires the militaries of both sides to 
prepare for possible military conflict. Yet, even regarding Taiwan, U.S. and Chinese leaders have a common interest 
in maintaining stability and preventing conflict. 
Is Globalization Irreversible 
Even if this is a viable analysis of the dynamics of globalization, what developments might change that calculus 
for the United States and China? A U.S.-China military conflict over Taiwan would, of course, have a potentially 
catastrophic impact on both countries (as well as Taiwan) that would ricochet throughout the world, including the 
world economy and the future of the globalization process. Many other developments or crises also could undermine 
globalization and the world economy and challenge the trend toward greater strategic interdependence in a 
globalizing world. A global depression that led to a contraction of economic ties, greater protectionism, and a 
reversal of the trend toward strategic interdependence could occur as a result of many different factors, such as a 
significant economic crisis in China, a massive terrorist attack on the United States, perhaps with WMD, extremist 
takeovers in Saudia Arabia and other oil producing states, a rapidly spreading and lethal disease resulting from 
natural causes, bioterrorism, or “bioerror” from a biotechnology experiment or a global environmental disaster.xxxv
Even in such potentially catastrophic cases, however, the international response could be closer cooperation among 
the globalizing states rather than increased conflict. Moreover, much of the fabric of globalization-especially the 
interconnectedness through the Internet and other communications flows-might be sustained or quickly reconstituted 
and the expansion of the economic globalization process resumed eventually rather than be permanently set back or 
even abandoned.  
Political leaders will have to maintain a strategic perspective on the need for international cooperation to preserve 
and strengthen the international system and to meet the challenge of failing states in the face of domestic pressures 
to pursue narrow national interests in conflicts with other globalizing states or in response to transnational threats. 
This has already proven difficult between the U.S. and its traditional allies and could be even more difficult in 
relations with China. And rising nationalism globally-including in China and Japan-is already complicating 
management of relations among the globalizing states. 
Prospects for Closer U.S.-China Strategic Cooperation 
Will China and the U.S. become strategic competitors-even military rivals-in the early 21st Century rather than 
develop normal relations or even a limited strategic partnership? After the demise of the Soviet empire, many 
strategic thinkers began to look for another comparable “peer” competitor that might emerge to challenge the United 
States in the 21st Century. China became the likely candidate for a variety of reasons, including its rapid economic 
rise, its nominally communist, authoritarian government, its sheer size and military potential, and its Cold War 
legacies, including the Taiwan dispute. China’s potential to be the second most powerful country in the world and 
the military preparations by the Chinese and U.S. militaries for a possible military conflict in the Taiwan Strait have 
reinforced the perception among some analysts that China will inevitably be a strategic competitor and even an 
inevitable adversary in military conflict.xxxvi
This outcome is neither inevitable nor even most likely. The prospect that the United States and China will be 
able to avoid relationship-threatening crises on the one hand and build a strategic partnership on the other is 
strengthened by the larger picture of the new strategic realities of major power relations and the twin strategic 
5. Competition for Political and Economic Advantage 
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creates disincentives to zero-sum, strategic competition and places constraints on aggressive behavior toward each 
other despite continued jockeying for political influence and economic advantage within the parameters of the 
international game that the major powers, now including China, recognized must be respected and jointly defended 
to preserve their own national interests. At the same time, major powers like the United States and China 
increasingly face common strategic threats that cannot be managed unilaterally but rather require bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation and thus compel these states to find new ways to enhance cooperation. 
The recent past, during which the United States and China have carefully managed their differences while 
cooperating on issues of common interest, suggests that this is politically possible as well as strategically desirable. 
Despite an early crisis over the downing of a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance plane in his first administration, President 
Bush dropped campaign rhetoric referring to China as a “strategic competitor” and adopted a strategic course with 
China that has followed the path of strategic engagement charted by his predecessors. The U.S. and China sought to 
improve relations and forge a cooperative relationship with China in the two-three months prior to the September 
11th terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. After 9.11, relations continued improving as the 
two sides sought to forge closer cooperation, especially to counter global terrorism and proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD). 
The United States has encouraged China to take more responsibility as a global power. Deputy Secretary of State 
Robert Zoelleck’s September 21, 2005, speech in New York called on China to become a “responsible stakeholder” 
that not just benefits from the international system but that will work with the United States “to sustain the 
international system that has enabled its success.”xxxvii Zoelleck made a simple but compelling case for wide-ranging 
U.S.-China cooperation: “Picture the wide range of global challenges we face in the years ahead-terrorism and 
extremists exploiting Islam, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, poverty, disease-and ask whether it 
would be easier or harder to handle those problems if the United States and China were cooperating or at odds.” 
Secretary of State Condolezza Rice had said earlier in Tokyo that “we want China as a global partner, able and 
willing to match its growing capabilities to its international responsibilities.”xxxviii Secretary Rice praised China’s 
role in the Six-Party talks and added that “we welcome China’s support for the democratic government of 
Afghanistan. We appreciate China’s efforts to ensure stability in South Asia, and its support in the global war on 
terrorism—including joining our Container Security Initiative. And we look forward to working with China on other 
issues, to see if we can forge a common approach to the challenges of Sudan and Burma and Nepal.” In June 2004, 
then Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly also praised the unprecedented cooperation that had developed with 
China in congressional testimony, remarking: “In the key areas of security, by being a strong and reliable partner on 
the counter-terrorism front and an active participant in the Six-Party Talks, China has proven helpful in enhancing 
regional stability. It also shows promise that it is prepared to take on global responsibilities.”xxxix
The new level of cooperation in Sino-U.S. relations has not, of course, signaled the end of differences between 
the two countries,xl which continue to have serious differences on Taiwan, human rights, trade and other bilateral 
issues. Deep suspicions remain in each country of the other side’s strategic intentions. And the United States still has 
not settled on how to accommodate the rise of China. Moreover, building strategic trust and a more “normal” 
relationship between China and the United States will likely be a long-term enterprise. Nevertheless, there is a 
possibility that the two countries can consolidate a more stable, cooperative and productive relationship in the next 
few years. 
There are key general areas in which the U.S. and China share common interests and can benefit from 
cooperation in an increasingly globalized world but which could also lead to divergent actions, misunderstandings 
and conflict if there is little dialogue and mutual understanding. These issue areas include: 
· Meeting the challenges of weak, failing and failed states and transnational threats, including proliferation, terrorism, crime, disease, regional conflict, 
environmental degradation, etc. The U.S.-China Global Issues Forum announced April 13 highlights the potential for the U.S. and China to find areas of 
agreement and cooperation on the above range of issues.xli  
· Managing the world economy to maintain economic growth, expand free trade and minimize the impact of disruptions and instability produced by 
globalization. 
· Forging a common approach to energy security to maintain open access to energy resources and low energy prices while developing and expanding 
use of renewable energy resources. 
g y g p g j p g
challenges of the 21st Century. The process of globalization has created new strategic restraints and imperatives for 
globalizing nations, including China and the United States. The strategic interdependence of the globalization era 
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· Working together to strengthen reform and develop international institutions to meet the twin strategic challenges of the 21st Century.  
· Managing Cross-Strait relations to maintain stability and foster a cross-Strait dialogue that leads to agreement on a long-term modus vivendi and even 
a final arrangement between Taiwan and the Mainland. 
The future of the Taiwan problem and the North Korean nuclear issue will both be critical to the long-term future 
of Sino-American relations and U.S.-China strategic cooperation. U.S.-China strategic cooperation will be 
significantly enhanced if the North Korean nuclear weapons issue is successfully and peacefully resolved with 
critical help from China. Such an outcome would both enhance regional and global stability and demonstrate the 
value to critics in the U.S. and China of a Sino-American strategic partnership, increasing prospects for cooperation 
in other crucial areas, especially on China’s periphery from Central Asia through South and Southeast Asia, and on 
transnational threats. It also could pave the way for a new security mechanism for Northeast Asia and even the entire 
region that built on the mutual confidence and cooperation forged in the Six-Party Talks, especially between China 
and its neighbors as well as with the US, while building on the existing structure of U.S. bilateral alliances. 
Even more important for the future of Sino-American relations than joint success on the Korean Peninsula would 
be the establishment of a stable modus Vivendi between Taiwan and the Mainland-perhaps with the U.S. playing the 
role of a facilitator. This would remove or at least mitigate the most dangerous uncertainty in U.S.-China relations 
that currently has the potential to undermine U.S.-China ties and even draw the United States and China into a 
military conflict. Peacetime preparation for possible military conflict against each other-put another way, Chinese 
planning for possible attacks on U.S. forces-is unique in U.S. relations with globalizing states. None of the other 
major states have a foreseeable reason to use military force against the United States and none is preparing 
specifically to so. Creating a framework for long-term peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait would at least ease the 
military competition between the U.S. and China and even raise the possibility of U.S.-China military cooperation, 
including in efforts to maintain security of sea lanes for commerce and energy supplies. In any case, a significant 
diminution of the possibility of conflict over Taiwan would likely ease strategic suspicions between the two 
countries and strengthen the ability of the bilateral relationship to manage globalization’s disruptive contradictions 
that will complicate and constantly threaten to undermine bilateral ties. 
While the U.S. needs to approach Sino-American relations with caution, especially regarding the course of 
China’s future development and international ambitions and behavior, it would also seem prudent to explore a future 
U.S.-China relationship that could provide substantial strategic benefits to the United States. This could include a 
close partnership with the United States on a wide range of issues of strategic importance to both countries. Such a 
relationship with China may be of increasing importance to the U.S. due to both the growing impact of China on the 
world economy and U.S. economic prosperity and to the potential for new crises and dangers emanating from failing 
states and transnational issues that require international cooperation. A habit of cooperation may reinforce U.S.-
China strategic cooperation and a more “normal” relationship between the two countries. Such a trend in U.S.-China 
relations might also create more space for the Chinese leadership to move forward with political reform internally, 
although that is a more speculative conclusion. 
The United States may place additional emphasis on the importance of China as a “strategic partner” in the future 
if relations with European allies remain troubled by differences over the war in Iraq and other the U.S. foreign 
policies and the Europeans focus more on internal matters of the European Union (EU). China, like the United 
States, is freer to act independently of other nations than are the major powers in Europe, which are increasingly 
entangled in the EU and its efforts to forge a common foreign and security policy. Although European powers may 
act bilaterally with the United States on some issues, they all face pressure from other European states and from 
their publics to adhere to a common EU foreign policy. Yet, the EU finds it difficult to reach consensus on 
controversial issues like Iraq and even on further steps toward European unity as indicated by the French and Dutch 
rejection of the European Constitution. Thus, the development of a united Europe acting as a unitary state on foreign 
and defense policy in partnership with the United States may be a long way off. China, on the other hand, has no 
such constraints from other states and is less restrained by public opinion. The United States and China, indeed, 
although not sharing many of the values that are common to the U.S. and its European allies,xlii are the two major 
powers most able to act independently and decisively should their political leaders deem it desirable to do so. And 
on many issues of strategic importance to the United States, especially in Asia, China may have more influence than 
any other potential partner, including even Japan. Japan is likely to continue to be more limited in its freedom of 
action than China, especially due to its history, even though Japan continues to be the most important U.S. ally in 
· Managing and developing Asian multilateral cooperation in the security and economic realms while ensuring that the United States maintains a 
leading role and robust military capabilities in the Western Pacific. 
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the region. And China, not Japan, has emerged as the engine of growth for East Asia-including Japan’s emergence 
from its decade-long economic stagnation-and a nascent global power. Whether the U.S. and China will choose to 
act together to meet strategic challenges, however, remains highly uncertain. Moreover, it is also essential that the 
United States develop and pursue a compatible if not common strategy toward China with the Europeans to ensure 
that China’s rise-and either closer Sino-American cooperation or exacerbation of Sino-U.S. differences and tensions 
does not drive the U.S. and Europe further apart.xliii
Conclusion 
The economic and political “rise” of China in East Asia has been “the story” in the region and indeed the world 
in the past two years and is likely to continue to be for years and perhaps decades to come. China’s rise remains a 
complex and confusing conundrum for American leaders, analysts, and the public. Making sense of the Chinese 
puzzle and how to manage the rise of China, India and other powers in the coming century will nevertheless be 
critical to U.S. interests and to global stability and prosperity. This is particularly true for U.S. leaders, who will 
have a significant influence on how China-and other rising powers-adapt and integrate into the global economy and 
strategic context. 
The United States has played a decisive role in China’s rise, dating back to President Richard Nixon’s 
foresightful 1971—1972 opening to the People’s Republic after more than two decades of hostile isolation. Indeed, 
Nixon had warned in 1967 that “taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the 
family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors.”xliv The world “cannot be 
safe until China changes,” Nixon added, noting that China must be persuaded that its own national interest requires 
“turning inward toward the solution of its own domestic problems.” Nixon and all his successors have followed 
some variation of a strategy of “strategic engagement” with China aimed at supporting China’s opening up and 
economic reform policies premised on the assumption that a developing China that brings its people out of poverty, 
builds a modern economy, and becomes interdependent with the world economy is more likely to support the world 
system and act as a responsible power than would a weak and alienated China.xlv
China’s success has been faster and more far-reaching than most observers ever imagined not only at the time of 
normalization in 1979 but even a decade ago, however. Now China’s success-which U.S. strategy and policy has 
continued to help foster in a myriad of ways for more than three decades-is creating anxiety in the U.S. and around 
the world. The alternative to China’s succeeding, however, might be even more disconcerting. A weak, crisis-ridden 
and economically failing China could be highly destabilizing for Asia and the world, a net drain on the global 
economy rather than one of its key engines of growth, and a serious blow to the health of the U.S. economy. 
The “rise of China” should not be overestimated either by the United States or the Chinese themselves, however. 
Many people in the U.S. overestimated the comprehensive national power of the Soviet Union in the 1970s and of 
Japan in the 1980s, predicting first the Soviet Union and then Japan would displace the United States as the number 
one power in the world-predictions that seem laughable today. China’s undeniably enhanced power and growing 
global impact-while clearly destined to “move around the heavy furniture” of geopolitics should not be viewed 
without considering a comprehensive picture that includes China’s structural weaknesses and the extraordinary 
challenge it faces in seeking to sustain economic growth, maintain political stability, and address the enormous and 
intractable internal problems that threaten to slow and even reverse its forward trajectory. Moreover, while the 
United States faces its own internal problems and challenges to maintaining its economic health and competitiveness, 
for the foreseeable future the U.S. is likely to remain the number one power globally, the indispensable power in 
Asia and a vital strategic partner for China.xlvi And in the military realm, while China’s growing military capability 
is worrisome for the U.S. in some scenarios, especially regarding a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, China does not 
appear capable even if that were its strategic goal of becoming a military “peer competitor” in the foreseeable future 
and may be falling further behind the U.S. technologically as the United States spends an order of magnitude more 
on defense every year.xlvii
The globalization process has created new strategic realities facing globalizing states that are likely to shape their 
foreign and security policies. This new strategic environment is creating a strategic interdependence that likely will 
constrain the United States and China from pursuing zero-sum strategies toward each other. At the same time, the 
any other potential partner, including even Japan. Japan is likely to continue to be more limited in its freedom of 
action than China, especially due to its history, even though Japan continues to be the most important U.S. ally in 
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imperatives for China and the United States (and other globalizing states) to enhance their bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation to defend and maintain a mutually beneficial global system, despite differences on specific issues and 
continued economic and political competition within that system. These twin strategic challenges are likely to be the 
strategic focus of the U.S. and China not a new Sino-U.S. Cold War of zero-sum, strategic competition. 
The contradictions among increasingly mutually dependent and mutually vulnerable (though not always equally 
so) globalizing states that are created or exacerbated by globalization will complicate efforts to develop and 
maintain strategic cooperation among these states, however. These contradictions will exacerbate domestic political 
pressures on political leaders to act internationally in ways they may believe are detrimental to their nation’s long-
term interests. In some crucial cases, situations may have to first reach crisis proportions before national leaders can 
overcome domestic parochialism and resistance to engage in such strategic cooperation. Moreover, managing 
relations among the globalizing states will also be complicated by competition for political and economic advantage, 
strategic suspicions and balance of power politics-all of which are likely to be attenuated by globalization and 
strategic interdependence but none are likely to be eliminated in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, it is also 
possible that U.S. and Chinese leaders will maintain a broader perspective on their common strategic interests and 
the need for the U.S.-China bilateral and multilateral cooperation to protect and advance those interests and 
therefore seek to prevent their bilateral differences, which are often exacerbated by domestic politics, from 
undermining the ability of the two countries to work together on a strategic level. 
As in the past, U.S. policy will strongly influence whether the challenges of a rising China are addressed in a way 
that facilitates the further peaceful integration of China into the global and regional economic and strategic 
environment. The United States remains the most important actor in this complex situation of increasing economic 
integration with persisting and sometimes growing tensions among key states. And while U.S. alliances will 
continue to provide the bedrock of U.S. strategic policy in the Asia-Pacific region, the relationship between “rising 
China” and the “still rising United States” will be a key defining factor in the future of the Asia-Pacific and indeed 
of world politics in the coming century. The core question for the United States may be whether it is willing to 
accommodate a rising power which includes providing international space for that power and respecting its vital 
interests-or is committed to maintaining permanent global dominance and thus is determined to prevent the 
expansion of China’s diplomatic and economic role in Asia and beyond, even if China behaves according to the 
international rule set that was largely forged under United States leadership since World War II. Although some U.S. 
leaders may prefer the latter course, the need for cooperation with China and U.S. resource limitations threatening 
“imperial overstretch” may nevertheless lead the United States to the former course, however reluctantly.xlviii
Appendix A: What Is Globalization 
There is a lack of consensus on the significance and the meaning of the term globalization, including whether 
globalization is solely an economic process or a broader phenomenon.xlix Some globalization “skeptics” have argued 
that globalization is nothing new, but rather a pattern of international economic integration that has been going on-
albeit with some interruptions-since the end of the 19th Century or even before. To support this view, skeptics have 
pointed out that the current scale of global trade is actually smaller than in the past; for example, trade flows as a 
percentage of GDP were even greater on the eve of World War I than they were in 2000. Others, while conceding 
this point, counter that the current era of globalization is qualitatively as well as quantitatively different from 
previous periods due to the “thickness” and greater complexity of networks of interdependence, which involve 
people from more regions and social classes than in the past.l Still others, foreign policy analysts in particular, argue 
that globalization, whether or not it is something new, has not fundamentally altered the structure or nature of the 
international system, which continues to be dominated by individual states caught in a zero-sum, anarchic world.li
Although there is little agreement among observers on a definition of the term “globalization,” as well as heated 
debate on the costs and benefits of this phenomenon, the monumental qualitative and quantitative changes in the 
world political, social, and cultural as well as economic and technological-that have taken place in the last quarter of 
the 20th century and continue into the 21st justify the use of a term that differentiates the current period from that 
which came before. While imprecise and controversial, the term globalization is already recognized by both 
proponents and opponents and is accepted throughout the world to describe the current period. 
twin strategic challenges of managing the world of globalizing states and coping with the world of the least 
globalized, weak and failing states and transnational threats are increasing common interests and strategic 
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Richard Haass, currently President of the Council on Foreign Relations. Haass noted in 2001 that globalization 
“cannot be reduced to merely the sum of interactions between and among nation-states,” but rather “is something 
more and something very different.” Globalization, according to Haass, “is the totality and velocity of connections 
and interactions-be they economic, political, social, cultural-that are sometimes beyond the control or even 
knowledge of governments and other authorities.” Moreover, Haass says, “globalization is characterized by the 
compression of distance and the increasing permeability of traditional boundaries to the rapid flow of goods, 
services, people, information, and ideas.” In addition, globalization “is a multifaceted, transnational phenomenon” 
and, at the same time, is decentralized, emerging “from countless individual decisions and actions taken every day 
all around the world.” Haass adds that as a result of the spread of open markets and open societies and the impact of 
new communication and information-processing technologies, “globalization has accelerated and fundamentally 
extended its reach.”lii
Globalization is driven in large part by a basic characteristic of humanity-a continual process of innovation and 
change or, put differently, the unrelenting quest or motivation to improve ways of doing things, which produce 
changes in organizations, societies, nations and, indeed, the entire world. This drive for improvement and innovation 
is found in all fields of human endeavor, ranging from science and technology, to production and management, to 
war and politics, to culture and ideology. Over the centuries, the innovative impulse has created pressure on 
countries, societies, organizations and even individuals to keep up with an ever-changing “state of the art.” In the 
period of globalization, this “state of the art” is disseminated internationally and sometimes almost instantaneously, 
through information technology as well as through global market forces, compelling others to adopt and adapt. 
In the last quarter of the Twentieth Century, the rapid global dissemination of the “state of the art” coalesced with 
other political, social and diplomatic as well as economic and technological changes to produce the period of 
globalization. Although the process of innovation and obsolescence preceded the globalization era, a unique 
confluence of factors has helped to magnify this process. These factors include: a worldwide ideological and 
philosophical shift in support of market economies with more open political and economic systems liii ;
disillusionment with socialist policies in Western European capitalist economies; the failure of communism and 
subsequent collapse of the Soviet and Eastern European communist regimesliv; the accelerated integration of world 
economies after the demise of the bipolar structure based on two economic models, U.S.-led capitalism and Soviet-
led socialism; and new advances in digital technology that have vastly expanded the quantity and sharply lowered 
the cost of international communications and financial transactions.  
The process of continual innovation and obsolescence has led to the development and dissemination of new 
technologies and techniques that have improved people’s lives and created tremendous-and unevenly distributed-
wealth. This process, however, is also one of “creative destruction,” that is deeply and broadly disruptive as it 
compels adoption of or adaptation to new ways of doing things but also leads to resistance from those who see it as 
threatening to their interests or values. Moreover, the disruptive effects of the new technologies and techniques often 
ripple out in unexpected and for many people undesirable-ways that profoundly affect the entire society. This can 
generate a strong and even violent backlash to the changes being wrought in the society, sometimes leading to 
extremist movements and fueling internal conflict and external terrorism. 
This process has been increasingly unfettered since the end of the Cold War division of the world into two 
competing strategic, political and economic blocs and the “triumph” of the ideology of free markets, open societies 
and democracy. Moreover, globalization has increased the pace of innovations in many if not all areas of human 
activity that are occurring simultaneously or nearly simultaneously, amplifying the disruptive effects on societies 
and organizations. The resulting dislocations and social and economic disruption-and the fear of such dislocations-
appear to be a major stimulus of an anti-globalization, nationalistic backlash within societies and even globally. 
Western countries, especially the United States, which are frequently the source of innovation, are often viewed as 
the leader and key benefactor of globalization at the expense of others and thus often are the key targets of 
globalization’s opponents. Although of perhaps unprecedented intensity and scope, such backlash is in fact is a 
common response to the process of relentless innovation.  
A particularly useful definition of “globalization” that implicitly differentiates the current era from previous 
periods of extensive global trade is provided by former director of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department, 
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The United States and the People’s Republic of China held the inaugural U.S.-China Global Issues Forum in 
Washington on April 13, 2005. Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs Paula Dobriansky and Assistant Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Shen Guofang led interagency delegations, with the participation of relevant bureaus and offices 
of the Department of State and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as other U.S. and Chinese agencies. 
The objective of the Global Issues Forum is to identify ways to strengthen cooperation between the United States 
and China on transnational issues and to explore new avenues of joint work on a global basis. In addition, the Forum 
seeks to enhance U.S.-China cooperation on global issues in international institutions. 
The inaugural session focused on U.S. and Chinese activities around the world and the potential to cooperate 
globally across four clusters of issues: clean energy and sustainable development; humanitarian assistance, poverty 
alleviation, and development financing; law enforcement; and public health.  
In the area of sustainable development and clean energy, the two sides discussed a range of global environmental 
issues such as biodiversity conservation, persistent organic pollutants, climate change, international clean energy 
cooperation; coordination to realize the goals of the World Summit on Sustainable Development; environmental 
partnerships; and the prospects for concerting U.S. and Chinese policies in fora such as the Commission on 
Sustainable Development and on cooperative initiatives relating to cleaner and more efficient use of existing fuels, 
development of new energy technology such as hydrogen, reducing greenhouse gas emissions from electric power 
plants, and collaborating to improve access to cleaner and modern energy in poorer regions of the world. 
The humanitarian assistance, poverty alleviation, and development financing segment examined how donor 
governments can work to support and improve international response to humanitarian crises; aid financing 
mechanisms; and Millennium Development Goals. 
The session on law enforcement focused on ways to combat transnational criminal activity, including bilateral, 
multilateral and global law enforcement initiatives, and cooperative efforts to counter, among other crimes, 
cybercrime, corruption, intellectual property crime, and trafficking-in-persons. 
Discussion of public health issues included experiences with SARS and avian influenza; international 
cooperation to enhance surveillance of infectious diseases; and policy and technical tools to combat outbreaks of 
disease.
The two sides agreed to continue their dialogue on these and other global issues of common concern, and to 
convene the Global Issues Forum annually at the current level to review progress and determine future activities in 
these and other areas, and that the second such Forum should be held in China in the first half of 2006. They agreed 
that the discussion in the Global Issues Forum was productive and that the Forum adds a new dimension to the 
steadily broadening and deepening U.S.-China relationship. 
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